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Casenotes
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS BEHIND BARS:
TO DENY A PRISONER PORNOGRAPHY, THE THIRD
CIRCUIT IN RAMIREZ v. PUGH REQUIRES PROOF
OF DETRIMENT TO REHABILITATION
I. INTRODUCTION
As ordinary citizens, we tend to take our First Amendment
rights for granted.' We do not think twice about speaking our
minds, reading what interests us, or attending the church of our
choosing.2 Nevertheless, incarcerated citizens are more susceptible
to having those same rights impinged upon in the name of govern-
ment interests. 3
In Ramirez v. Pugh,4 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit renewed a First Amendment challenge to the Ensign
Amendment, a law that bans federal prison inmates from receiving
material that is "sexually explicit" or features nudity.5 The Third
Circuit addressed whether prohibiting inmates from receiving sexu-
ally explicit material is necessary to promote prisoner rehabilita-
tion, or is instead, a violation of their First Amendment rights. 6
Departing from the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit,7 the Third Circuit held that the Ensign
Amendment could be found constitutional only if an evidentiary
1. For a discussion of First Amendment rights, see infra notes 23-24 and ac-
companying text.
2. See id. (detailing guarantees of First Amendment).
3. For a discussion of prisoners' rights in light of government regulations, see
infra notes 114-84 and accompanying text.
4. 379 F.3d 122, 124 (3d Cir. 2004).
5. See Shannon P. Duffy, Suit Revived over Porn Ban in Prisons: Restriction Must
Be Reasonably Related to Legitimate Penological Interests, 177 N.J.L.J. 605 (2004) (high-
lighting circuit split caused by Ramirez).
6. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 125 (defining challenge raised by prisoner plain-
tiff). For the text and discussion of the First Amendment, see infra notes 23-32
and accompanying text.
7. SeeAmatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding statutory
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record supported a connection between the denial of the sexually
explicit material and the goal of rehabilitation.8
Courts did not begin to recognize prisoners' constitutional
rights until the 1960s and 1970s.9 Society now recognizes that in-
mates do not surrender their constitutional rights upon entering
prison. 10 Highlighting the need to protect a prisoner's rights, the
D.C. Circuit recognized, "Few minorities are so 'discrete and insu-
lar,' so little able to defend their interests through participation in
the political process, so vulnerable to oppression by an unsympa-
thetic majority [as prisoners]."" While prisoners' rights are of sig-
nificant concern, prison administrators need to perform the
prison's daily operations, including maintaining order.1 2 The ap-
pellate courts have struggled to reconcile these two competing
concerns. 13
This Casenote examines the Third Circuit's decision in Rami-
rez. Section II discusses the relevant law, including the Ensign
Amendment, the First Amendment and the Turner test, and the cur-
rent circuit split.14 Section III sets forth the facts of Ramirez.15 Sec-
tion IV presents the Third Circuit's opinion. 16 Section V evaluates
8. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 131 (describing court's holding). For a discussion
of the Ensign Amendment, see infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
9. See Stacey A. Miness, Note, Pornography Behind Bars, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
1702, 1704-06 (2000) (describing historical development of prisoners' constitu-
tional rights).
10. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) (stating constitutional protec-
tions continue within prison). Prisoners must be given the same rights of ordinary
citizens, as long as those rights do not conflict with the goals of incarceration. See
14C AM. JUR. LEGAL FoRMs 2D Penal Institutions § 199:3 (2005).
11. Amatel, 156 F.3d at 204 n.2 (Wald, J., dissenting) (quoting Doe v. District
of Columbia, 701 F.2d 948, 960 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
12. See id. at 204 (Wald, J., dissenting) (emphasizing conflicting interests at
stake).
13. Compare Ramirez v. Pugh, 379 F.3d 122, 126 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing
Turner test and emphasizing appropriate balance between prisoners' rights and
prisons administrators' institutional needs), with Amatel, 156 F.3d 192, 195-96 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) ("In [prison], the government is permitted to balance constitutional
rights against institutional efficiency in ways it may not ordinarily do.").
14. For discussions of the Ensign Amendment, First Amendment, Turner test
and circuit split, see infra notes 19-67 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the Ramirez facts, see infra notes 68-75 and accompany-
ing text.
16. For a discussion of the Ramirez opinion, see infra notes 76-113 and accom-
panying text.
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the Third Circuit's analysis of Ramirez.17 Finally, Section VI assesses
the likely impact of the Third Circuit's holding.18
II. BACKGROUND
a. Ensign Amendment
The Ensign Amendment was enacted as part of the Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 and has since been codi-
fied.i 9 By passing the Ensign Amendment, Congress has barred the
use of Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") "funds to pay for the distribution
of commercial material that 'is sexually explicit or features
nudity.'" ' 20 The BOP has promulgated regulations defining the
Amendment's important terms.21  Those regulations control
softcore and hardcore pornography that prisoners receive. 22
17. For a discussion analyzing the Ramirez court's rationale, see infra notes
114-84 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the possible impact of the holding in Ramirez, see infra
notes 185-99 and accompanying text.
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 530C(b) (6) (2005) (authorizing and outlining appropriate
use of funds). Section 530(b) (6) (D) provides in relevant part: "[N]o funds may
be used to distribute or make available to a prisoner any commercially published
information or material that is sexually explicit or features nudity." Id.
20. Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Omnibus Con-
solidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 614, 110 Stat. 3009
(1997)). Prior to the passage of the Ensign Amendment in 1996, "federal regula-
tions authorized prison wardens to reject a publication 'only if it [was] determined
detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution or if it
might facilitate criminal activity.'" Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b) (2000) (altera-
tion in original)). While there is no restriction on prisoners obtaining the mate-
rial at their own expense, this Note will treat the spending restriction as a ban on
distribution. See id. at n.1 (noting prisoners obtaining material at own expense is
not realistic).
21. See 28 C.F.R. § 540.72(b) (2000) (defining "sexually explicit," "commer-
cially published information," "nudity," and "features"). "Sexually explicit" is de-
fined as "a pictorial depiction of actual or simulated sexual acts including sexual
intercourse, oral sex, or masturbation." Id. "Features" means that the publication
in question "contains depictions of nudity or sexually explicit conduct on a routine
or regular basis or promotes itself based upon such depictions in the case of indi-
vidual one-time issues." Id. There is an exception to "features" for material that
contains nudity "illustrative of medical, educational, or anthropological content
.... .Id. "Nudity" means "a pictorial depiction where genitalia or female breasts
are exposed." Id. Examples of publications that do not "feature nudity" include
National Geographic, Sports Illustrated Swimsuit Issue, and the Victoria's Secret catalog.
See Ramirez v. Pugh, 379 F.3d 122, 125 (3d Cir. 2004) (referring to Fed. Bureau of
Prisons Program Statement 5266.07 (Nov. 1, 1996), affd, Fed. Bureau of Prisons
Program Statement 5266.10 (Jan. 10, 2003)). "[T]here is no restriction ... on
non-pictorial sexually explicit material." Amatel, 156 F.3d at 194.
22. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 125 (identifying target of regulations).
2006]
3
Ford: First Amendment Rights behind Bars: To Deny a Prisoner Pornograph
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006
76 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
b. First Amendment
The Ensign Amendment's most profound issue is whether it
infringes upon a prisoner's First Amendment rights. 23 Whether a
person is a prisoner or free citizen, the First Amendment guaran-
tees freedom from government intrusion upon religion, speech,
press, public assembly, and grievances. 2 4 When prison administra-
tors regulate a prisoner's mail, there is a potential violation of the
First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. 25 The Supreme Court has
emphasized, "Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison
inmates from the protections of the Constitution." 26 Nevertheless,
in an environment such as prison, where government regulation is
required and is by its very nature more intrusive than general stan-
dards, the government is at liberty to balance constitutional rights
against institutional efficiency in ways that could not be done in
another setting.27 Attempting to strike an appropriate balance be-
tween a prisoner's constitutional rights and the prison administra-
tors' institutional needs, the United States Supreme Court has held
that prison regulations must be "reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests." 28
The Court's balancing approach has highlighted significant
policy concerns. 29 If strict scrutiny were applied, the inability "to
23. See id. (noting plaintiffs argument that Ensign Amendment violates his
First Amendment rights); Amatel, 156 F.3d at 195 (detailing prisoners' challenge to
Ensign Amendment as First Amendment violation).
24. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (enumerating First Amendment's guaranteed
freedoms). The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
25. See Miness, supra note 9, at 1707-08 (discussing section of First Amend-
ment potentially violated by Ensign Amendment).
26. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987); see also Amatel, 156 F.3d at 195
("Cases analyzing constitutional claims by those within governmental institutions
such as prisons, public schools, the military, or the government workplace often
open with the axiom that the boundaries of those institutions do not separate in-
habitants from their constitutional rights.").
27. See Amatel, 156 F.3d at 196 (listing case law that supports concept that
government is entitled to balance rights against efficiency). Yet, the Amatel court
further noted that "a regulation that promotes an illegitimate or non-neutral goal"
cannot pass the Turner test. See id.
28. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (defining applicable standard when prison regula-
tion interferes with inmate's constitutional rights). The Court has recognized the
tension between a prisoner's constitutional rights and the reality that the legisla-
tive and executive branches, rather than the judiciary, are more suited to run the
country's prisons. See Ramirez v. Pugh, 379 F.3d 122, 125-26 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting
Supreme Court's difficult task of reconciling two competing principles).
29. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 ("[S]uch a standard is necessary if 'prison ad-
ministrators..., and not the courts, [are] to make the difficultjudgments concern-
[Vol. 13: p. 73
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adopt innovative solutions" to administrative and security problems
would hamper prison officials' daily decisions. 3° Further, prison of-
ficials' decisions would constantly be subject to the possibility that a
court could identify a less restrictive solution to the particular prob-
lem. 3 1 The balancing test allows prison administrators to enforce




The Supreme Court has developed a four-part test ("Turner
test") to assess the overall reasonableness of a regulation that impli-
cates a prisoner's constitutional rights.3 3 In Turner v. Safley, the
Court addressed two regulations the Missouri Division of Correc-
tions promulgated. 34 The first regulation provided that correspon-
dence with other inmates, who were not immediate family
members, was only permitted if "the classification/treatment team
of each inmate deem[ed] it in the best interest of the parties in-
volved. ' 35 The second regulation at issue permitted an inmate to
marry only with the permission of the prison's superintendent, and
that approval would be given only when there were compelling rea-
sons.3 6 To determine the constitutionality of the prison regula-
tions, the Supreme Court applied the following multi-factor test,
the Turner test.3 7
The first factor requires a "'valid, rational connection' between
the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put
ing institutional operations."') (alteration & ellipsis in original) (quoting Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977)).
30. See id. (outlining potential negative effects of heightened scrutiny stand-
ard).
31. See id. ("Courts inevitably would become the primary arbiters of what con-
stitutes the best solution to every administrative problem . . ").
32. See id. at 87 (requiring reasonable relation between regulation and legiti-
mate penological objective).
33. See id. at 89-91 (setting out relevant factors to determine regulations'
reasonableness).
34. See Turner, 482 U.S at 81-82 (discussing two regulations at issue). The re-
spondents were inmates at the Renz Correctional Institution located in Cedar City,
Missouri. See id. at 81.
35. Id. at 81-82 (describing first regulation being challenged for
constitutionality).
36. See id. at 82 (detailing challenged marriage regulation). "[G]enerally only
a pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate child would be considered a compelling
reason." Id.
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forward to justify it.'"38 The regulation will not pass muster if the
connection to the governmental objective is so remote as to render
it arbitrary or irrational. 9 Further, this factor requires that the gov-
ernmental interest be legitimate and neutral.40
The Turner test's second factor evaluates "whether there are
alternative means of exercising the [prisoner's] right. '4 1 The third
factor considers the impact accommodating the constitutional right
would have on prison guards, other inmates, and "allocation of
prison resources .... "42 If a substantial "ripple effect" on fellow
inmates and prison staff is likely to result from the accommodation
of the prisoner's right, courts should give particular deference to
the prison officials' discretion.43
The final factor addresses the availability of alternatives for the
proposed regulation, where the absence of ready alternatives for a
prison regulation helps demonstrate the regulation is reasonable. 44
The Supreme Court noted the fourth factor is not a "least restric-
tive alternative" test; prison officials do not have to eliminate every
conceivable method of accommodating the prisoner's constitu-
tional complaint. 45 Rather, if inmates can identify an accommodat-
ing alternative at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, then
the regulation may not be reasonable. 46
These factors help form "a single reasonableness standard." 47
The first factor, in particular, tends to be the most important be-
38. Id. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
39. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90 (noting outer limits of rational connection).
40. See id. at 90 ("[The Supreme Court has] found it important to inquire
whether prison regulations restricting inmates' First Amendment fights operated
in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression.").
41. Id. (defining second factor). "Where 'other avenues' remain available for
the exercise of the asserted right, . .. courts should be particularly conscious of the
,measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials .... '" Id. (citation
omitted) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
42. Id. The Court noted the "closed environment" of prisons increases the
likelihood that institutional changes will affect the liberty of those within the
prison system and the overall institutional order. See id.
43. See id. (emphasizing situation when balance should weigh in favor of
government).
44. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (describing fourth factor). The existence of easy
alternatives suggests the response is exaggerated and not reasonable. See id.
45. See id. at 90-91 (explaining that officials need not "set up and shoot down"
every possible alternative).
46. See id at 91 (noting that court should consider evidence of possible ac-
commodation at de minimis cost).
47. Ramirez v. Pugh, 379 F.3d 122, 126 (30 Cir. 2004) (explaining purpose of
Turner test's four factors); see also Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (noting similar purpose of Turner test's four factors).
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cause it encompasses the remaining factors. 48 After applying these
factors in Turner, the Supreme Court held the regulation barring
inmate-to-inmate correspondence "was reasonably related to legiti-
mate security interests. '49 Nevertheless, the marriage restriction
failed to satisfy the reasonable relationship standard and was there-
fore held invalid. 50
d. Circuit Split
The Third Circuit openly acknowledged in Ramirez that its de-
cision contradicted the D.C. Circuit.51 In Amatel v. Reno, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit deter-
mined the constitutionality of a statutory ban on the use of BOP
funds to distribute sexually explicit material to prisoners.52 The
plaintiffs, three inmates who were denied the receipt of Playboy and
Penthouse, "filed suits alleging that the Ensign Amendment violated
their First Amendment rights."53 The U.S. District Court for D.C.
applied the Turner test, found the Ensign Amendment facially inva-
lid, and consequently enjoined its enforcement. 54
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court also applied the four factors
of the Turner test to assess the challenged regulation.55 The Amatel
court emphasized the first factor, the rationality inquiry, tends to
address the remaining factors and is limited to promoting a legiti-
mate, neutral goal.56 The government's asserted goal was prison-
48. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 126 ("[T]he first [factor] looms especially large
because it tends to encompass the remaining factors, and some of its criteria are
apparently necessary conditions." (citing Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 213-
14 (3d Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
49. Turner, 482 U.S. at 91 (concluding first Missouri regulation was constitu-
tional because record established reasonable relationship between regulation and
legitimate security interest).
50. See id. (noting marriage regulation was not valid because it constituted "an
exaggerated response to petitioners' rehabilitation and security concerns").
51. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 131 ("Contrary to the decision in Amate4 we be-
lieve this to be a case in which factual development is necessary for evaluating the
Ensign Amendment and its implementing regulation under Turner.").
52. See Amatel, 156 F.3d at 194 (identifying issue of case).
53. Id. at 195 (outlining facts of case). Each prisoner filed a separate suit, but
"their suits were consolidated, along with similar suits filed by the publishers of
[the] magazines and a publishing trade organization." Id. For a discussion of the
Ensign Amendment, see supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of the First Amendment, see supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
54. See Amatel, 156 F.3d at 195 (noting decision of lower court).
55. See id. at 196 (discussing court's analysis of Turner test's four factors). For
a discussion of the Turner test used to determine the overall reasonableness of
prison regulations, see supra notes 33-50 and accompanying text.
56. See Amatel, 156 F.3d at 196 (highlighting importance of first factor and
noting that regulation promoting illegitimate or non-neutral goals is prohibited).
2006]
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ers' rehabilitation. 57 The D.C. Circuit found the Ensign
Amendment satisfied the neutrality requirement based on the no-
tion that "neutral" means merely that "the regulation or practice in
question must further an important or substantial governmental in-
terest unrelated to the suppression of expression."58 The court
found the government's rehabilitative interest met this "thin" neu-
trality requirement. 59
The Amatel court decided the government can attach sanctions
or exclude speech that threatens its goals because a government
has the power to pursue its legitimate goals within reasonable limits
in its own institutions. 60 The Amatel court found that the generality
of the Turner reasonableness test, plus common sense, suggested
that "flexibility open to the political branches" must be at its highest
in "institutions for the care and custody of those who have already
transgressed society's norms."6 1
Consequently, the Amatel court found that the government
could have rationally linked rehabilitative values and banning por-
nography.62 Asserting that common sense is the standard element
of reasonableness and rationality, the court relied on common
57. See id. (noting government's interest). The Congressional Record stated,
"Magazines that portray and exploit sex acts have no place in the rehabilitative
environment of prison, nor should we pay Bureau of Prison[s] staff to distribute
them." 142 CONG. REc. H8261 (daily ed. July 24, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Ensign).
58. Amatel, 156 F.3d at 197 (quoting Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 415
(1989)). The district court looked at the statute, rather than the goal, and found
the statute non-neutral. See id. (assessing district court's conclusion). While the
Ensign Amendment is a content-based statute, the D.C. Circuit held that the
Amendment does not violate Turner's neutrality requirement. See id. "Neutrality"
in the Turner sense is quite different from the familiar First Amendment notion of
"content-neutrality." See id.
59. See id. (concluding rehabilitative interest satisfies first factor of Turner
test).
60. See id. at 198 (describing actions that government can take without violat-
ing free speech). Thus, according to the court, the government cannot pursue any
value it wishes, but an "inculcation of values cannot be characterized as a suppres-
sion of expression in every context." Id.
61. Id. (giving deference to power of political branches in restricting prison-
ers' freedom of speech in effort to promote respect for authority and traditional
values).
62. See id. at 199 (finding that government satisfied rationality requirement of
first Turner factor). The Amatel court recognized that Congress could have per-
ceived pornography as tending to impede the character growth of those who view
it. See id. The court further found that while the government may have been opti-
mistic in thinking that the exclusion of pornography in prisons would have a posi-
tive impact, that goal was not irrational. See id.
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sense rather than record evidence. 63 The court stated, "Common
sense tells us that prisoners are more likely to develop the now-miss-
ing self-control and respect for others if prevented from poring
over pictures that are themselves degrading and disrespectful." 64
The Amatel court then considered the three remaining Turner
factors and found that each was satisfied. 65 The court concluded
that it is unnecessary to make individual prisoner determinations as
to whether pornography would harm that prisoner's rehabilita-
tion.66 Therefore, the Amatel court upheld the Ensign Amendment
because it was based on the legitimate goal of prisoner rehabilita-
tion, and there was a rational connection between the goal of reha-
bilitation and a wholesale exclusion of pornography.67
III. FACTS
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ad-
dressed the constitutionality of the "Congressional ban on the use
of federal funds to distribute certain sexually explicit material to
prisoners" in Ramirez v. Pugh.68 The plaintiff, Marc Ramirez, filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
63. See Amatel, 156 F.3d at 199 (finding despite no record evidence of social
science data proving pornography hinders rehabilitation, Turner test requires
nothing more than common sense).
64. Id. The court noted, "Of course, it seems quite likely that a culture and its
manifestations have a mutually reinforcing relationship, so that a prohibition of
pornography is a reasonable element of a struggle against machismo and its ill
effects." Id. at 200.
65. See id. at 201 (finding Ensign Amendment satisfies three remaining fac-
tors). For the second factor, the D.C. Circuit found that prisoners do have alterna-
tive means of exercising the right at stake because a broad range of publications
can still be "sent, received, and read." Id. (relying on similar conclusion in Thorn-
burgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 418 (1989)). The court found the third factor was
satisfied by deferring to Congress: "if Congress may reasonably conclude that por-
nography increases the risk of prison rape, then the adverse impact is substantial."
Id. Addressing the fourth factor, the court determined that the prisoners' rights
could not be accommodated at de minimis cost. See id. Specifically, the court found
that sifting through the mail of each prisoner would incur significant administra-
tive burdens, and the sexually explicit material approved for only one prisoner
could still be passed to other inmates. See id.
66. See id. (noting costs of prisoner-by-prisoner determinations are "far from
de minimis"). The court concluded prisoner-by-prisoner determinations evaluating
the effect of the received pornography would impose an administrative burden.
See id. Moreover, given that prisoners are likely to pass pornographic materials
around, making the prisoner-by-prisoner determination would be futile. See id.
67. See id. at 202 (concluding statute satisfied Turner reasonableness test and
satisfied all four factors). The D.C. Circuit remanded the case to the district court
to address vagueness issues, but the D.C. Circuit lifted the permanent injunction
previously imposed on the regulation. See id. at 203 (reversing and remanding to
district court).
68. 379 F.3d 122, 124 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating issue of case).
2006]
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Pennsylvania in 1997, and named the United States Attorney Gen-
eral, the director of the BOP, and the warden of the Allenwood
institution where he was imprisoned (collectively, the "govern-
ment") as defendants. 69 Ramirez claimed magazines addressed to
him were withheld by prison officials because the material was pro-
hibited under the Ensign Amendment for being "sexually explicit"
or "featuring nudity. '7 0 Ramirez argued the Ensign Amendment
violated his First Amendment rights.71
After applying the Turner test, the district court held that the
Ensign Amendment and its regulations passed constitutional mus-
ter.72 Ramirez appealed the district court's decision, arguing the
court incorrectly found a rational connection between the ban on
pornography and rehabilitation. 73 Specifically, Ramirez contended
the district court failed to engage in a "'contextual, record-sensitive
analysis' before determining the ban's overall reasonableness under
Turner."74 The Third Circuit reversed and remanded the case to
the district court for an evidentiary hearing. 75
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
a. Application of the Turner Test
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ana-
lyzed the Ensign Amendment's constitutionality by first applying
the Turner test.7 6 The court realized the tension between a pris-
oner's constitutional rights and the fact that the judicial branch was
not created to run the country's prisons.7 7 Acknowledging this ten-
69. See id. at 125 (identifying parties in lawsuit).
70. Id. (defining plaintiffs contention).
71. See id. (contending First Amendment violation).
72. See id. (describing district court's holding). The district court based its
decision on the following findings:
[The Amendment and its regulations]... were rationally connected to
the government's asserted interest in prisoner rehabilitation, prisoners
still had access to a broad range of materials (including materials with
sexually explicit text), accommodating the asserted right to view explicit
materials would threaten the safety of correctional staff and other in-
mates, and no ready alternative existed that would accommodate Rami-
rez's asserted right at a de minimus cost to valid penological interests.
Id. (detailing district court's reasoning).
73. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 125 (establishing basis of plaintiffs appeal).
74. Id. (highlighting crucial argument of plaintiffs appeal).
75. See id. at 131 (giving holding of case).
76. See id. at 125-26 (introducing principles leading to need for test to deter-
mine reasonableness of regulation).
77. See id. at 126 (recognizing conflicting principles). The legislative and ex-
ecutive branches are responsible for running the country's prisons. See id. (refer-
ring to Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987)).
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sion, the court applied the four factors articulated in Turner to de-
termine whether a prison regulation that implicates an inmate's
constitutional rights is "reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests. 78
The court's threshold inquiry was whether a "'valid, rational
connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate gov-
ernmental interest" existed. 79 The second factor the court applied
was "'whether there are alternative means of exercising the right
that remain open' [sic] to prisoners."80 The third factor the court
applied was "' [what] impact accommodation of the asserted consti-
tutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the
allocation of prison resources generally."' 81 The fourth and final
factor the Ramirez court applied was whether there existed "'ready
alternatives' that would fully accommodate the constitutional right
'at de minimus cost to valid penological interests.' "82
b. Critique of Amatel's Application of the Turner Test
Before deciding the Ensign Amendment's constitutionality,
the Ramirez court evaluated the decision of the D.C. Circuit in
Amatel, which previously heard a First Amendment challenge to the
Ensign Amendment. 3 The Amatel court rejected the First Amend-
ment challenge, finding that the restriction on the distribution of
sexually explicit material was reasonably related to the legitimate
penological interest of prisoner rehabilitation. 84 The Ramirez court
noted that in Amatel, the D.C. Circuit broadly defined the interest
of rehabilitation as the "promotion of 'respect for authority and
traditional values' [which is] a legitimate rehabilitative purpose in
and of itself."8 5
78. Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 126 (repeating Turner's four factors). For a discussion
of the Turner test, see supra notes 33-50 and accompanying text.
79. Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
80. Id. (quoting second Turner factor from Turner, 482 U.S. at 90).
81. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting third Turner factor from Turner, 482
U.S. at 90).
82. Id. (quoting fourth Turner factor from Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91).
83. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 126 ("To date, the United States Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit is the only federal appellate court to have considered the mer-
its of a First Amendment challenge to the Ensign Amendment and its implement-
ing regulation.").
84. See id. (stating holding of Amatel court); Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192,
201-02 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (declaring holding of case).
85. Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 126 (quoting Amatel, 156 F.3d at 202-03). The Amatel
court believed Congress could have perceived pornography as impeding character
growth and that without pornography prisoners could develop self-control and re-
spect. See id. (referring to Amatel, 156 F.3d at 199).
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In addition, the Third Circuit noted that the Amatel court con-
sidered an evidentiary record unnecessary. 86 Rather, the Amatel
court concluded that a court's own common sense was sufficient to
verify the rational connection between the Ensign Amendment's
prohibitions and the rehabilitative goal.8 7 According to the Ramirez
court, the Amatel court determined that the remaining three Turner
factors did not undermine the overall reasonableness of the Ensign
Amendment.8
c. A Common Sense, Rational Connection
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
Wolf v. Ashcroft, previously addressed whether the rational connec-
tion between a prison regulation and a legitimate penological inter-
est can be based on common sense alone.8 9 In Wolf, the Third
Circuit struck down a prohibition against showing R-rated and NC-
17-rated movies in federal prisons.9 0 In reversing the district
court's decision, the Third Circuit found that the lower court failed
to state the relevant penological interest.9 1 The Third Circuit
explained:
86. See id. (noting that Amatel court did not rely on evidentiary record); see also
Amate4 156 F.3d at 199.
87. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 126 (explaining Amatel's decision and rationale).
The Amatel court did, however, cite scholarly research to support the reasonable-
ness of the proposition that pornography leads to male objectification of women
and other negative effects. See Amatel, 156 F.3d at 199-200 (discussing and citing
scholarly analysis of pornography and sexual aggression) (citations omitted).
88. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 127 (detailing Amatel analysis). Prior to proceed-
ing with its analysis, the Third Circuit addressed a prior case, Waterman v. Farmer,
183 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 1999), in which the court considered the constitutionality of
a restriction similar to the Ensign Amendment. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 127 (ad-
dressing Waterman, 183 F.3d at 209). In Waterman, the Third Circuit "upheld a
New Jersey statute that restricted prisoners' access to pornographic materials at a
facility for sex offenders who exhibited 'repetitive and compulsive' behavior." Id.
(quoting Waterman, 183 F.3d at 210). The court identified the interest as rehabili-
tating the state's "most dangerous and compulsive sex offenders." Ramirez, 379
F.3d at 127 (quoting Waterman, 183 F.3d at 215). In evaluating the connection
between the statute and the asserted goal of rehabilitating sex offenders, the Third
Circuit relied on an evidentiary record consisting of expert testimony stating that
sex offenders' exposure to pornography would impede rehabilitative strategies,
and further hinder treatment administered by prison staff. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at
127 (referring to Waterman, 183 F.3d at 215-16).
89. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 127 (explaining that question was addressed in
Wolf v. Ashcroft, 297 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2002)).
90. See id. (referring to Wo/f holding).
91. See id. (stating district court opinion was deficient because it never identi-
fied penological interest). "The government offered several theories in general
terms at different times, but the District Court opinion did not mention or discuss
any such theories or interests." Wolf, 297 F.3d at 308. The three possible interests
were prison security, crime deterrence, and rehabilitation. See id.
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While the connection may be a matter of common sense
in certain instances . . .there may be situations in which
the connection is not so apparent and does require some
factual development. Whether the requisite connection
may be found solely on the basis of 'common sense' will
depend on the nature of the right, the nature of the inter-
est asserted, the nature of the prohibition, and the obvi-
ousness of its connection to the proffered interest.9 2
Thus, the Third Circuit made clear in Wo/f that a "brief, conclusory
statement" does not suffice when analyzing the Turner test's first
prong.9 3
d. Rehabilitative Interest and Rational Review
The Third Circuit found the district court erred in evaluating
the Ensign Amendment under the Turner test's first prong because
it failed to inquire into the interests involved and the connection
between those interests and the restriction. 94 The court found fur-
ther error in the district court's decision because although the con-
nection between the Ensign Amendment and rehabilitation of
federal sex offenders may be obvious under Waterman, where the
prison housed only sex offenders, that connection becomes attenu-
ated when considered in the context of the entire population of
BOP inmates.9 5 When an inmate's incarceration is not due to a
sexual offense, the rehabilitative purpose supporting the denial of
pornography becomes less apparent. 96 Consequently, in light of a
diverse inmate population, a factual record becomes necessary to
92. Ramirez, 397 F.3d at 127 (quoting Wolf 297 F.3d at 308-09). The court
rejected the government's assertion that a connection between a prison regulation
and the proffered interest could always be found without an evidentiary hearing.
Id.
93. Id. (referring to Wolf 297 F.3d at 308).
94. See Ramirez, 397 F.3d at 128 (finding fault in district court holding). The
district court made a decision "without adequately describing the specific rehabili-
tative goal or goals furthered by the restriction on sexually explicit materials." Id.
95. See id. (noting that prison at issue in Ramirez is different than Waterman
prison). In Waterman, the prison was only for sex offenders, hence the connection
between prohibition of sexually explicit material and rehabilitation was obviously
rational. See Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 209 (3d Cir. 1999). For a discus-
sion of the facts and holding of Waterman, see supra note 88. The prison at issue in
Ramirez is a low-security correctional institution not limited to sex offenders. See
Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 124, 129.
96. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 129 (noting Ensign Amendment's constitutionality
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determine the rationality of the Ensign Amendment's overall con-
nection to rehabilitative interests.97
The Ramirez court acknowledged that while the obvious goal of
rehabilitation is to prevent recidivism, the Supreme Court has
never defined the scope of this interest.98 The Ramirez court found
the following were within the legitimate bounds of the rehabilita-
tion interest: (1) prison policies targeting the behavioral patterns
that led to a prisoner's incarceration, or (2) behavioral patterns de-
veloped in prison that pose a threat of other lawbreaking activity. 99
Despite this recognition, the Third Circuit drew a line: "To say...
that rehabilitation legitimately includes the promotion of 'values,'
broadly defined, with no particularized identification of an existing
harm towards which the rehabilitative efforts are addressed, would
essentially be to acknowledge that prisoners' First Amendment
rights are subject to the pleasure of their custodians."100 The Rami-
rez court's conclusion on this point caused the present split between
the Third Circuit and the D.C. Circuit.10 1
Although the Ensign Amendment narrows a prisoner's rights,
the Third Circuit opined that courts must uphold their responsibil-
ity to scrutinize the government's reasons for infringing upon those
rights. 10 2 The Third Circuit hypothesized that if the Ensign
Amendment's scope was limited to federal prisoners who have com-
mitted sex crimes or violence against women, then the means-end
connection would be sufficiently obvious to satisfy the first prong of
the Turner test based on common sense.103 Because the entire fed-
97. See id. at 128 (stating need for factual record). The Third Circuit in-
structed the district court on remand to identify with particularity the specific re-
habilitative goals advanced by the government, and then allow the parties to
provide evidence that would sufficiently enable a court to find a rational connec-
tion between the goals and the restriction. See id. (confirming instructions to dis-
trict court on remand).
98. See id. (recognizing ambiguousness of rehabilitative interest).
99. See id. (exemplifying legitimate bounds of rehabilitative interest).
100. Id. (quoting and disagreeing with D.C. Circuit in AmateO.
101. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 128 ("To the extent that the Amatel majority de-
fines rehabilitation in this way, we disagree with its reasoning.").
102. See id. at 128-29 (noting that courts have duty of inquiry under Turner
test). The Supreme Court previously noted, "[Turner's] reasonableness standard is
not toothless." Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414 (1989). The Third Cir-
cuit instructed that a district court must describe with particularity the specific
rehabilitative goal justifying the challenged regulation. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at
129.
103. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 129 (describing situation where common sense
can determine reasonableness). Compare id. (rejecting obvious connection), with
Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 220 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding prohibition against
sexually explicit material clearly connected to rehabilitation of recidivist sex
offenders).
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eral inmate population included prisoners not incarcerated for sex-
related crimes, the Ramirez court did not find the connection be-
tween the Ensign Amendment and the government's rehabilitative
interest sufficiently obvious. 104
e. Evidentiary Requirement
The Third Circuit explicitly demanded that a reviewing court
develop a factual record. 10 5 The Ramirez court was concerned that
in the absence of a factual record, the regulation could rationally
apply to a small percentage of the BOP inmate population, but its
connection to the rehabilitative interest of other prisoners could be
"so remote as to render [it] arbitrary or irrational."'10 6 Therefore,
the court strongly advocated that to establish a rational link be-
tween sexual material and an injury to rehabilitation, the propo-
nent must provide more than a conclusory statement asserting that
the sexually explicit material undermined the viewer's ability to re-
spect others. 07
Likewise, the Ramirez court confirmed that the evidentiary basis
extended to the remaining three factors of the Turner test: "[W] e
have historically viewed these inquiries as being fact-intensive ...
[requiring] 'a contextual, record-sensitive analysis."'" 08 The court
admitted that one exception where evidence may not have been
necessary to evaluate the other prongs was where the link between
the regulation and the government interest was "sufficiently obvi-
ous."10 9 Nevertheless, the court specifically noted that factual de-
104. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 129 (stating that given diverse prison population,
rehabilitation is not obviously connected to enforcement of Ensign Amendment).
105. See id. at 129 (relying on Wolf v. Ashcroft, 297 F.3d 305, 309 (3d Cir.
2002)) (noting that Third Circuit precedent required evidentiary showing, corre-
sponding to degree that required means-end connection is demonstrated).
106. Id. at 130 (alteration in original) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
89-90 (1987)). The court emphasized that sex offenders are not the only legiti-
mate target of the Ensign Amendment. See id. at 129-30. Rather, the court recog-
nized that the government has wide latitude in pursuing its legitimate
rehabilitative goals, and the court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the
legislative and executive branches where the government's position is simply less
reasonable. See id. at 130.
107. See id. at 130 (confirming need for evidentiary record). The Third Cir-
cuit required some independent analysis of whether the connection is rational. See
id. at n.3. The court rejected the determination in Amatel that scholarly findings
were sufficient for establishing a rational connection. See id. (emphasizing need
for evidentiary hearing).
108. Id. at 130 (alteration in original) (quoting Wolf, 297 F.3d at 310).
109. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 130 (noting scenario where evidentiary basis not
needed). Yet, in Ramirez, the court concluded that the third and fourth Turner
factors cannot be assessed without an evidentiary record. See id. at 130-31 ("[T]he
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velopment was required to determine the adverse impact on
guards, other inmates, and resources. 10 Likewise, alternatives that
can accommodate the right at a de minimis cost to penological inter-
ests would require factual considerations.1"'
The Third Circuit was not convinced by the district court's
findings of potential risks that could arise if sexually explicit mate-
rial was given to a particular prisoner, concluding these risks were
"speculative and unsupported."' 1 2 Therefore, unlike the D.C. Cir-
cuit's decision in Amatel, the Third Circuit required factual develop-
ment to evaluate the constitutionality of the Ensign Amendment
under the Turner test." 13
V. CRnCAL ANALYsis
a. Turner Test
The Turner test examines the constitutionality of a prison regu-
lation by applying rational basis scrutiny rather than heightened
scrutiny.114 Determining whether the regulation that impinges on
a prisoner's constitutional rights is "reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests" is the foundational inquiry of the rational ba-
sis review. 1 5 The rational basis test is appropriate because it bal-
ances two competing principles. 1' 6 The first principle is that
third and fourth Turner factors cannot be adequately assessed in the absence of an
evidentiary foundation.").
110. See id. (establishing that factual considerations are required for third fac-
tor of Turner test).
111. See id. at 130-31 (explaining that fourth factor of Turner test also requires
evidence).
112. Id. at 131 (demonstrating disagreement with district court findings).
The Ramirez court asserted that the risk of sexual crimes and misconduct that
could result from accommodating the prisoner's right was unproven. See id. The
court further noted that the possibility of a "ripple effect" was disputable. See id.
113. See id. (reiterating circuit split). The Third Circuit reversed the judg-
ment, holding that the district court erred in determining that the Ensign Amend-
ment was reasonably related to the legitimate government interest of
rehabilitation, absent an adequate factual basis. See id. (reversing and remanding
so appropriate proceedings can be conducted before reevaluating amendment
under Turner).
114. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987) (stating that in prisoner
rights cases, Supreme Court did not apply heightened scrutiny standard, but in-
quired whether regulation that burdens "fundamental right is 'reasonably related'
to legitimate penological objectives"). Contrary to the Eighth Circuit's application
of a strict scrutiny analysis, the Supreme Court in Turner held that a lesser standard
of scrutiny is appropriate in determining the constitutionality of the prison regula-
tions. See id. at 81.
115. Id. at 89.
116. See id. at 84-85 (discussing principles that frame analysis of prisoners'
constitutional claims).
[ ol. 13: p. 73
16
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol13/iss1/2
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS BEHIND BARS
federal courts have an obligation to recognize the constitutional
claims of prisoners.'17 The second principle is that the courts are
not adequately equipped to deal with urgent problems involving
prison administration and reform. 118 The rational basis standard of
review is responsive to both judicial restraint and the necessary pro-
tection of constitutional rights." 9
Both the Third Circuit and the D.C. Circuit were highly aware
of the tension between prisoner rights and prison administrators'
autonomy. 120 Furthermore, both courts applied the same four fac-
tors of the Turner test.12' Despite relying on the same test, the Ra-
mirez court and the Amatel court came to different conclusions




To support the validity of the Ensign Amendment, the govern-
ment asserted rehabilitation as its interest.' 23 The Third Circuit
and the D.C. Circuit differed in their views on the boundaries of
rehabilitation, despite rehabilitation being observed as a valid peno-
117. See id. at 84 (emphasizing that prisoners maintain their constitutional
rights even after incarceration).
118. See id. (recognizing court's inabilities); see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) ("[T]he problems of prisons in America are complex and
intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution
by decree."). Running a prison lies within the expertise of the legislative and exec-
utive branches. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85 (noting prison administration has
been committed to these branches of government). "Subjecting the day-to-day
judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny would seriously hamper
their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to
the intractable problems of prison administration." Id. at 89.
119. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 85 (demonstrating that rational basis scrutiny is
best standard of review).
120. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 126 (recognizing need to balance prisoners' con-
stitutional rights and prison administrators' institutional needs); see also Amatel v.
Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing permissible amount of gov-
ernment intrusion in prison context).
121. Compare Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 126 (discussing Turner's four factors), with
Amatel, 156 F.3d at 196 (applying four factors from Turner). For a discussion of the
Turner Test, see supra notes 33-50 and accompanying text.
122. Compare Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 131 (analyzing Ensign Amendment under
Turner and striking it down), with Amatel, 156 F.3d at 203 (upholding Ensign
Amendment after applying Turner test).
123. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 128 (identifying rehabilitation as legitimate peno-
logical interest). Other possible legitimate penological interests include security
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logical objective. 12 4 Further, as the Ramirez and Amatel courts high-
lighted, the Supreme Court has not defined the scope of the
rehabilitative interest.125
The Ramirez court was skeptical of the Amatel court's expansive
view of rehabilitation.1 26 The Amatel court relied on the congres-
sional discussions leading to the Ensign Amendment's enactment,
in which House members emphasized sexually explicit materials
"have no place in the rehabilitative environment of prisons .... 12
The congressional record suggested that denying prisoners sexually
explicit magazines would be harmless. 128
Following the congressional history of the Ensign Amendment,
the Amatel court noted that the goal of imprisonment was rehabili-
tation.129 The Amatel court accepted that inculcating values under
the guise of rehabilitation may be necessary for prison institutions
to take necessary care of those in its custody. 130 The court asserted
that while the infusion of values may conflict with the First Amend-
ment, a state was permitted to "become a player in the marketplace
of ideas," especially in government-sponsored institutions. 31
124. See generally O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (indi-
cating that rehabilitation is one of primary goals of penal institutions); see also Pell
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974) ("[S]ince most offenders will eventually
return to society, another paramount objective of the corrections system is the
rehabilitation of those committed to its custody.").
125. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 128 ("[T]he scope of the [rehabilitative] interest
itself has never been defined by the Supreme Court."); Amatel, 156 F.3d at 209
(Wald,J., dissenting) ("Unlike its interest in institutional security, the contours of
the government's interest in rehabilitation are quite amorphous and ill-defined.").
126. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 128 (disagreeing with Amatel's holding "that reha-
bilitation legitimately includes the promotion of 'values,' broadly defined, with no
particularized identification of an existing harm towards which the rehabilitative
efforts are addressed .... ").
127. Amatel, 156 F.3d at 196 (quoting 142 CONG. REC. H8261, H8262 (daily
ed. July 24, 1996) (statement of Rep. Ensign)) (noting that Rep. Ensign enlight-
ened Congress by saying, "[t]he infamous serial killer Ted Bundy... stated before
his death his belief that pornographic materials directly contributed to his violent
crimes").
128. See 142 CONG. REC. H8262 (daily ed. July 24, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Ensign) (stating that "cutting prisoners off from their sexually explicit magazines
will certainly do no harm").
129. See Amatel, 156 F.3d at 197 (relying on prison system's goal to reduce
"likelihood that prisoners would again transgress society's norms").
130. See id. at 198 (explaining that inculcation of values cannot be considered
as suppressing expression in every context).
131. See id. at 197-98 (indicating government cannot "pursue any value ..
But inculcation of values cannot be characterized as a suppression of expression in
every context"); see also Miness, supra note 9, at 1720 (characterizing D.C. Circuit's
statement as "bold").
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Justice Wald's dissent in Amatel is in accordance with the Rami-
rez approach to rehabilitation. 132 Despite acknowledging that reha-
bilitation was a legitimate government interest, Justice Wald noted
that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have abandoned rehabilita-
tion as an attainable goal. 133 Scientific evidence has failed to show
a causal relationship between the exposure to non-violent and non-
degrading sexual depictions and acts of sexual violence.' 3 4 Justice
Wald was concerned that using "rehabilitation" to infringe upon a
prisoner's First Amendment rights carries the potential for
abuse.' 35 In short, determining whether a particular publication
may frustrate a prisoner's rehabilitation is extremely difficult. 136
Further, there is a slippery slope argument: if pornography can
be taken away from prisoners in order to pursue rehabilitative
goals, then anything could be taken away.13 7 In essence, First
Amendment rights of prisoners could be eviscerated in the name of
rehabilitation. 38 Likewise, the Supreme Court has recognized that
a regulation can constitute "an exaggerated response" to a pris-
oner's rehabilitation. 139 Thus, to prevent such happenings, Justice
Wald's dissent in Amatel and the Ramirez court majority required
132. See Amate4 156 F.3d at 214 (Wald, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority's
decision "goes well beyond prior precedent and the case law in other circuits").
133. See id. at 206 (Wald, J., dissenting) (questioning importance placed on
rehabilitation); Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 324 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Congress aban-
doned 'rehabilitation' as a justification of imprisonment when it enacted the Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 1984.").
134. See Amatel, 156 F.3d at 209 (Wald, J., dissenting) (citing EDwARD DONNER-
STEIN ET AL, THE QUESTION OF PORNOGRAPHY 177 (1987)) (stating conclusion of
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography).
135. See id. at 209-10 (WaldJ., dissenting) (recognizing possibility of abuse in
name of rehabilitation). "[U]ndertaking the Herculean task of 'character-mold-
ing' is inherently problematic in its First Amendment implications, for it presuma-
bly involves casting emerging prisoners in society's own image." Id. at 210.
136. See id. at 210 (highlighting complexities of determining effects on reha-
bilitative effort). Justice Wald argued that Congress cannot claim that it knows
how to rehabilitate an individual prisoner, let alone an entire prison population.
See id. at 209. Rehabilitation tends to involve, for example, a combination of "ther-
apy, drug and alcohol counseling, basic education, or job training .... Id.
137. See id. (highlighting effects if rehabilitation is taken too far). For in-
stance, "lawmakers who believe that books on Russian history may lead to disre-
spect for the United States may ban those books for prisoners." Id. For other
hypothetical scenarios describing slippery slope, see id.
138. See id. (concluding First Amendment rights could disappear under ex-
pansive view of rehabilitation).
139. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987) (deciding marriage restric-
tion did not satisfy reasonable relationship standard but rather was "exaggerated
response" to petitioner's rehabilitation and security concerns).
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evidence establishing the connection between the sexually explicit
materials and the harmful effects on rehabilitation. 40
c. Rationality Requirement
The rationality requirement, encompassed by the first prong of
the Turner test, upholds as valid a regulation that intrudes on a pris-
oner's constitutional rights if it reasonably relates to "legitimate pe-
nological interests." 14' The Third Circuit in Ramirez found that the
connection between the Ensign Amendment and the government's
rehabilitative interest was not always obvious. 142 On the contrary,
the D.C. Circuit found a rational connection between the Ensign
Amendment and the rehabilitative interest even without a factual
record.143 Among other things, the two courts differed in their in-
terpretation of what constitutes a rational connection. 144
The Amatel court acknowledged, " [p] rison jurisprudence is not
well enough developed to indicate precisely how demanding the
requirement of a rational means-end connection is."' 45 The D.C.
Circuit took a deferential approach when assessing whether a ra-
tional connection existed between the regulation and the rehabili-
tative interest.1 46 The Amatel court adamantly held that its only
obligation was to establish whether the judgment was rational, and
not to determine whether it agreed with the legislative judgment
that pornography adversely affected rehabilitation. 147
140. See Amatel, 156 F.3d at 211 (Wald, J., dissenting) (encouraging need for
evidence instead of mere assertion of rehabilitation); Ramirez v. Pugh, 379 F.3d
122, 130 (3d Cir. 2004) (requiring evidentiary record).
141. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (establishing first applicable factor when testing
prison regulation's constitutionality).
142. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 129 (demonstrating connection is not clear with-
out factual record).
143. See Amatel, 156 F.3d at 199 (finding that "government could rationally
have seen a connection between pornography and rehabilitative values" without
factual record).
144. Compare Ramirez, 397 F.3d at 127-28 (emphasizing factual record to
demonstrate rational connection), with Amatel, 156 F.3d at 199-200 (refusing to
require factual record).
145. Amatel, 156 F.3d at 198 (explaining that degree of rationality required
has yet to be clearly established).
146. See id. at 199 ("The question for us is not whether the regulation in fact
advances the government interest, only whether the legislature might reasonably
have thought that it would."). The Supreme Court stressed in Turner that a ra-
tional basis review is "necessary if 'prison administrators ..., and not the courts,
[are] to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.'" Tur-
ner, 482 U.S. at 89 (1987) (alterations in original) (quotingJones v. N.C. Prisoners'
Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977)).
147. See Amatel, 156 F.3d at 199 (limiting judicial role to determining rational-
ity of legislative judgment); see also Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1060 (9th Cir.
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Believing that Congress could have perceived pornography as
frustrating the character growth of its consumers, the Amatel court
concluded that the government could have rationally seen a con-
nection between pornography and rehabilitative values.'14  The
court recognized that while the goals to be achieved from exclud-
ing pornography may be optimistic, they are not irrational. 149 Fur-
ther, the Amatel court held that the legislative judgment was within
the realm of reason.1
50
To the contrary, the Ramirez court strongly opposed a deferen-
tial approach to the rational basis standard of review, and instead
deemed the courts responsible for carefully scrutinizing the govern-
ment's reasons for infringing upon a prisoner's First Amendment
rights. 151 The Amatel dissent suggested that the rationality inquiry
should be "whether a challenged regulation is, in fact, reasonable
or whether it is an 'exaggerated response' to the 'legitimate govern-
ment interest put forward to justify it."152 Even under a reasona-
bleness test, some courts have performed a more in-depth review to
avoid blind acceptance of the legislature's reasoning. 153 The Amatel
dissent voiced a significant concern: "l[b] ut were [the courts] simply
to defer to Congress's assertion that the Ensign Amendment... was
reasonably related to the interest asserted, there would be no need
for judicial review at all, for no statute infringing on inmates' con-
1999) (acknowledging that exact fit between policy and prisons' objectives is not
required).
148. See Amatel, 156 F.3d at 199 (demonstrating legislative deference). But see
id. at 205 (Wald, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority appears to [permit] unblinking
deference to any 'plausible' legislative judgment about the 'rehabilitative' benefits
of denying a prisoner's most fundamental constitutional right .....
149. See id. at 199 (confirming rational connection).
150. See id. at 200 (finding pornography ban satisfied Turner's reasonableness
standard).
151. See Ramirez v. Pugh, 379 F.3d 122, 128-29 (3d Cir. 2004) (enforcing
stricter rational basis review); see also Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414
(1989) (discouraging assumption that government is correct and encouraging
more searching review of government's reasons).
152. Amatel, 156 F.3d at 205 (Wald, J., dissenting) (quoting Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987)). "The Court did not say, for example, that prison regu-
lations are valid if there is any conceivable basis for their existence, as rational basis
review is typically formulated." Id. (relying on Supreme Court case law). See, e.g.,
United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (noting ra-
tional basis review is not complete until "plausible reasons for Congress' action"
are identified).
153. See Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217, 227 n.17 (7th Cir. 1986)
("[D]eference to the administrative expertise and discretionary authority of cor-
rectional officials must be schooled, not absolute."); see also Miness, supra note 9, at
1739 (noting justification for higher standard of review).
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stitutional rights would fail to satisfy the test.' 1 54 Thus, the Ramirez
court has required the government to describe the exact rehabilita-
tion goal in order to justify the challenged regulation's
rationality.155
d. Evidentiary Record
The most divisive aspect between the opinions of the Third
Circuit and the D.C. Circuit is the requirement of an evidentiary
record to determine the rationality of the link between the regula-
tion and the government rehabilitation interest.' 56 Without record
evidence, sophisticated multiple regression analyses, and social sci-
ence data, the Amatel court adhered to the view that "conformity to
commonsensical intuitive judgments is a standard element of both
reasonableness and rationality. '1 57 The D.C. Circuit believed the
Turner holding did not require a more thorough inquiry. 158
Relying on common sense, the Amatel court concluded that
"prisoners are more likely to develop ... self-control and respect for
others if prevented from" viewing "degrading and disrespectful pic-
tures."' 59 In finding that pornography harmed the rehabilitation
efforts, the Amatel court was highly influenced by the following ob-
servations: (1) nonviolent pornography can lead to short-term in-
creases in angered men's aggressiveness,' 60 (2) pornography can
provide ideas for rape,' 6' and (3) pornography can lead to more
154. Amatel, 156 F.3d at 205-06 (Wald, J., dissenting) (noting possible result
when deference goes too far).
155. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 129 (relying on Wolf holding). Conclusory state-
ments make it difficult to determine what connection a court sees between the
advanced penological interest and a prison regulation. See Wolf v. Ashcroft, 297
F.3d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 2002).
156. Compare Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 130-31 (requiring evidentiary record), with
Amatel, 156 F.3d at 199-203 (determining connection without evidentiary record).
157. Amate4 156 F.3d at 199 (arguing that courts should rely on common
sense rather than hard data).
158. See id. (noting that court is abiding by Turner). The Amatelcourt believed
the Turner Court only searched the record for proof of a rational link between the
security interest and the marriage ban because common sense did not suggest a
link. See id.
159. Id. (making conclusion based on common sense observation that viewing
pornography has unwanted, implicit effects).
160. See id. at 200 (citing DONNERSTEIN, supra note 134, at 40-48) (noting
harmful effect attributed to pornography).
161. See id. (citing LARRY BARON & MuRRAY A. STRAuss, FOUR THEORIES OF
RAPE IN AMERICAN SOCIEr 185-87 (Yale University Press 1989) (noting correlation
between pornography and sex crimes)). Using evidence from Larry Baron and
Murray A. Strauss, the Amatel court concluded that "a prohibition of pornography
is a reasonable element of a struggle against machismo and its ill effects." Id. (rely-
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tolerance of violence against women. 162 The court was careful not
to suggest a causal link between pornography and violence against
women; however, it maintained that rewriting legislation was not
the judiciary's role.1 63 The Amatel court held that the legislative
judgment was "within the realm of reason under the standards ap-
plicable to the political branches' management of prisons."' 64 Be-
cause the court is only required to find a reasonable connection
between the legislative goals and subsequent actions, the D.C. Cir-
cuit was satisfied, despite scientific indeterminacy. 165
The Amatel court opposed using prisoner-by-prisoner determi-
nations to verify whether a particular publication will harm a pris-
oner's rehabilitation. 166 The court reasoned that such
determinations are costly, administratively burdensome, and be-
come futile because prisoners are likely to share the pornographic
materials with fellow inmates. 167 The D.C. Circuit further asserted
that the Ensign Amendment would probably not exclude harmless
materials.' 68 In addition, the court emphasized that the ban only
ing on correlation between circulation rates of sex magazines and reported rape
cases).
162. See Amatel, 156 F.3d at 200 (citing PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION
32-39 (Neil M. Malamuth & Edward Donnerstein eds., Academic Press, Inc. 1984))
(noting that pornography could cause men to think that women enjoy being
raped). "Although the experimental studies demonstrate that violent pornogra-
phy has more effect ... than nonviolent pornography, nonviolent pornography
still demonstrates an effect." Id. (quoting Mike Allen et al., Exposure to Pornography
and Acceptance of Rape Myths, 45 J. COMMUNICATIONS 5 (1995)).
163. See id. ("[W]hen Congress undertakes to act in areas fraught with medi-
cal and scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad and
courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation .... (quoting Marshall v. U.S.,
414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974))).
164. Id.
165. See id. at 200-01 (finding that despite inconclusive evidence on efficacy of
ban on pornography in promoting prisoner rehabilitation, reasonable connection
can still be found).
166. See id. at 201 (describing burden imposed by such determinations). The
Amatel court discussed the burden in the analysis of the fourth Turner factor:
whether the prisoner's right can be accommodated "at de minimis costs to valid
penological interests." Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91 (1987)). The
court noted that the costs of prisoner-by-prisoner determinations are "far from de
minimis." Id.
167. See Amate4 156 F.3d at 201 (explaining why prisoner-by-prisoner determi-
nation is not necessary). The court found the costs of the approach are not de
minimis. See id. It also noted that even if pornography could be distributed only to
those whose rehabilitation would not be affected, the reality is that the material
could be shared with others, interfering with their rehabilitation, and posing a
threat to safety. See id.
168. See id. at 201-02 ("We find it all but impossible to believe that the Swim-
suit Edition and Victoria's Secret pass muster while Michelangelo's David or con-
centration camp pictures fail; nor has there been any suggestion that any prison
official has attempted to implement such a bizarre interpretation.").
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applied to pictures; consequently, the ban could be seen as
strengthening the impact of literature because there are no distract-
ing pictures.1 69 Dismissing the need for an evidentiary record, the
Amatel court refused to remand the case to the district court to al-
low for the introduction of evidence. 170 Rather, the court rein-
forced that the issue was not whether pornography will hinder the
prisoner's rehabilitation, but whether Congress could have reasona-
bly believed that pornography would harm rehabilitation.171
In contrast to the D.C. Circuit, the Third Circuit believed that
the development of a factual record was necessary. 172 The Ramirez
court was not convinced that the connection between the Ensign
Amendment and the government's rehabilitation interest was obvi-
ous when applied to a diverse federal inmate population. 73 The
Third Circuit previously stated, "[W]hile the connection may be a
matter of common sense in certain instances .... there may be situ-
ations in which the connection is not so apparent and does require
factual development." 74 In congruence with the Ramirez court, the
United States Supreme Court previously indicated that the "individ-
ualized nature" of determinations ensures a policy that would not
result in "needless exclusions."' 75 Further, Justice Wald's dissent in
Amatel asserted that a regulation's reasonableness must be sup-
ported by evidence demonstrating the rational connection between
a regulation and a legitimate penological interest.176
169. See id. at 202 (noting prisoners can read what they please) (italics in
original).
170. See id. at 202-03 (suggesting that plaintiffs insistence to remand "miscon-
ceives the legal issue under [Turner]").
171. See id. at 203 (finding Ensign Amendment reasonable in relation to gov-
ernmental interest in rehabilitation).
172. See Ramirez v. Pugh, 379 F.3d 122, 129 (3d Cir. 2004) (indicating that
Wolf v. Ashcroft, 297 F.3d 305, 309 (3d Cir. 2002) necessitated factual record).
173. See id. (finding rational relationship between regulation and government
interest not facially obvious in all cases).
174. Wolf, 297 F.3d at 308 (emphasizing common sense standard does not
apply in.every situation). Whether the connection is to be determined only by
common sense depends on the nature of the right. See id. The Third Circuit has
found that in addition to the first prong of the Turner test, the remaining three
prongs are fact-specific. See id. at 310 (requiring record-sensitive analysis).
175. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1989) (finding restric-
tion reasonable to institutional safety concerns based on individualized
determination).
176. See Amatel, 156 F.3d at 207 (Wald, J., dissenting) (detailing Wald's disa-
greement with majority opinion). Justice Wald acknowledged that there are situa-
tions where the connection between the ban and rehabilitation interest is obvious;
however, the connection between the ban on nudity and rehabilitation is murky,
and because courts are disconnected from a prison's daily operations, they are less
able to assert the connection accurately. See id. Justice Wald stated:
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The Third Circuit is not alone in its requirement of an eviden-
tiary record; other jurisdictions have also required evidence to de-
termine the rationality between a prison restriction and the
government's penological interest. 177 The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has ordered that in compliance with Turner, prison
administrators must offer evidence to support the prison's restric-
tion of constitutional rights. 178 In addition, the Tenth Circuit inval-
idated a restriction where the defendants could not provide any
evidence showing the restrictions were reasonably related to prison
security. 179 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has stated that prison au-
thorities cannot rely on general or conclusory assertions, but rather
must provide an evidentiary showing. 180
Research showing that the relationship between pornography
and criminal activity was only correlative and not causative en-
hanced the need for evidence to support the connection between
the ban on pornography and rehabilitation.18 1 Further, evidence
proved that simply viewing depictions of sexual activities had no
effect on the viewer.182 Even studies finding a positive connection
I believe it was incumbent upon the government to point to some evi-
dence demonstrating a connection between all publications that are sexu-
ally explicit or that feature nudity and a tendency to engage in criminal
or disruptive behavior, keeping in mind that our task is to determine
whether such a connection is reasonably likely to exist, not whether one
might be conceivable.
Id. at 211.
177. See id. at 208 (listing other courts that have found need for evidentiary
record).
178. See Shimer v. Washington, 100 F.3d 506, 509-10 (7th Cir. 1996) (requir-
ing evidentiary support that restriction is reasonably related to penological inter-
est). For a discussion of other courts requiring an evidentiary record, see infra
notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
179. See Mann v. Reynolds, 46 F.3d 1055, 1061 (10th Cir. 1995) (defeating
regulation in absence of evidence to support rational connection with administra-
tive goal).
180. See Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 386 (9th Cir. 1990), affd, 8 F.3d 33
(9th Cir. 1993) (demanding evidence to support connection between ban and in-
terest). The Ninth Circuit has required that prison authorities "must first identify
the specific penological interests involved and then demonstrate that those specific
interests are the actual bases for their policies and that the policies are reasonably
related to the furtherance of the identified interests," with an evidentiary showing
required for each point. Id.
181. See Amatel, 156 F.3d at 208-09 (Wald, J., dissenting) (referring to ques-
tionable association between pornography and crime). The difference in meaning
between these two words is imperative. "Correlative" means "related or corre-
sponding." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 281 (7th ed. 2000). "Causative" means "effec-
tive as a cause or producing a result." Id. at 173.
182. See Amatel, 156 F.3d at 209 (referring to DONNERSTEIN, supra note 134, at
177) (asserting that scientific evidence could not show causation between non-vio-
lent and non-degrading sexual depictions and acts of sexual violence); see also id.
(basing conclusions on Ernest D. Giglio, The Danish Experience with Pornography: Is
20061
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between violent pornography and aggressive behavior could not de-
cipher whether the aggression was due to the material's violent con-
tent or sexual content.183 In light of such findings, the Ramirez
court held, in contrast to Amatel, that an evidentiary record was nec-
essary for evaluating the Ensign Amendment under Turner.184
VI. IMPACT
a. Consequential Costs
The Third Circuit has taken a substantial step toward protect-
ing prisoners' First Amendment rights by requiring an evidentiary
record when determining the Ensign Amendment's constitutional-
ity. 185 Arguably, the costs of conducting prisoner-by-prisoner deter-
minations will be an administrative burden, cosdy, and quickly
made pointless when prisoners distribute the pornographic materi-
als to other prisoners.' 86 Yet, in light of these possible conse-
quences, the Third Circuit believed that limited distribution of
pornographic materials can be conducted with de minimis costs to
valid penological interests. 187 A case-by-case review may not pose an
additional administrative burden because under the Ensign
Amendment prison officials are already required to examine each
There a Lesson for America?, in 8 COMPARATIVE SociAL RESEARCH 281, 285 (Richard F.
Tomasson ed., 1985) ("[A] positive causal relationship between pornography and
sex crimes has not been documented by criminologists and psychologists.")).
183. See id. (Wald, J., dissenting) (noting inconclusive research results). See,
e.g., Baron & Strauss, supra note 161, at 8 ("It seems reasonable to conclude ...
that it is the violent content rather than the sexual content that facilitates
aggression.").
184. See Ramirez v. Pugh, 379 F.3d 122, 131 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding factual
development is necessary). The Ramirez court required factual development not
just for the first Turner factor, but also the remaining three factors. See id. at 130
(requiring evidentiary basis for three remaining Turner factors).
185. See id. at 124 (reversing district court which resolved constitutional issue
without adequate factual basis).
186. See Amatel, 156 F.3d at 201 (addressing third factor by showing adverse
impact on guards, other inmates, and prison resources if prisoner's right is accom-
modated). "Even if pornography could be directed only to those not likely to be
adversely affected, it could find its way to others, interfering with their rehabilita-
tion and increasing threats to safety." Id. (describing "ripple effect").
187. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 131 (noting that limited distribution at de minimis
costs is not impossible). In Waterman, the Third Circuit found the third and fourth
Turner prongs satisfied because the facility in question was insufficiently staffed to
conduct case-by-case reviews and prisoners were "more than likely" to pass materi-
als along to each other. See Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 220 (3d Cir. 1999)
(holding that costs of case-by-case determinations would not be de minimis). Yet, if
there was sufficient staffing, limited distribution could be achieved at de minimis
costs. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 131 (" [I] t does not follow from our decision in Water-
man that limited distribution can never be conducted at de minimus costs to valid
penological interests.").
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publication and determine whether it is sexually explicit or features
nudity.188 Moreover, resources can be further conserved by utiliz-
ing the psychological examinations routinely performed on inmates
to determine if they are eligible to receive sexually explicit
materials. ' 8 9
b. A New Standard of Review?
Some have suggested that intermediate scrutiny should be
used to evaluate the constitutionality of prison regulations, instead
of relying on the rational basis review of the Turner test.190 With
certain courts becoming increasingly deferential to prison authori-
ties, this intermediate scrutiny may stop "[the] progression toward
complete abrogation of prisoners' First Amendment rights." 191
While rehabilitation, order, and security are substantial interests,
prison administrators would have to show how banning sexually ex-
plicit material from inmates would actually promote those inter-
ests. 192 Intermediate scrutiny review of a prison regulation supports
the Ramirez court's justification for a required evidentiary record. 193
The Third Circuit in Ramirez has addressed the same concerns that
an intermediate scrutiny proposal seeks to solve by maintaining the
reasonableness standard under Turner, and additionally requiring
188. See Amatel, 156 F.3d at 213 (Wald, J., dissenting) (suggesting that addi-
tional administrative burden may not exist); see also Miness, supra note 9, at 1734
("Because a complete ban would still require officials to inspect publications, a
case-by-case approach would be no more burdensome on prison resources and
administrators than an overly broad scheme.").
189. See Miness, supra note 9, at 1734 (arguing that preserving prisoner's con-
stitutional rights does not add to administrative costs).
190. See id. at 1726 (suggesting intermediate scrutiny test would complicate
restriction of pornographic materials in jails). The intermediate scrutiny standard
asks whether the classification has a substantial relationship to an important gov-
ernment interest. See id. at 1710 n.64 (citing to JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 14.3, at 601-02 (5th ed. 1995)) (asserting that
courts should "independently determine the degree of relationship which the clas-
sification bears to a constitutionally compelling end").
191. Miness, supra note 9, at 1727 (explaining purpose of intermediate scru-
tiny). "Categorical censorship of publications compromises inmates' First Amend-
ment rights to free speech and expression, rights which the Supreme Court usually
protects vigorously." Id. (footnotes omitted).
192. See id. at 1732 (illustrating effect of increased level of scrutiny). Prison
officials would have to offer proof that a link between the regulation and the gov-
ernment interest exists. See id.
193. Compare Ramirez v. Pugh, 379 F.3d 122, 128 (3d Cir. 2004) (requiring
factual record to establish connection between Ensign Amendment and rehabilita-
tion), with Miness, supra note 9, at 1727-36 (asserting need for evidence to support
government interest promoted by prison regulation).
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an evidentiary record to prove the relationship between the peno-
logical interest and the prison regulation. 94
c. The Rights of Others
Cases challenging the constitutionality of the Ensign Amend-
ment address more than just prisoners' rights.195 While in Ramirez
the prisoner was the sole plaintiff, in Amatel the plaintiffs included
the prisoners, the publishers of the sexually explicit magazines, and
the publishing trade organization. 196 The Turner reasonableness
standard governs "regulations that affec[t] rights of prisoners and
outsiders."1 97 It is a natural consequence that the free citizens' First
Amendment rights are implicated when prisoners' mail is cen-
sored. 198 Requiring an evidentiary record to determine the Ensign
Amendment's constitutionality furthers the rights of publishers and
those sending mail to prisoners because those publications and let-
ters will not be categorically banned. 199
d. Conclusion
The Third Circuit's holding is a victory for Ramirez and other
prisoners who were denied publications because they were "sexually
explicit" or "featured nudity," even though their imprisonment re-
sulted from non-sexual crimes. 20 0 Creating a circuit split, the Third
194. See Miness, supra note 9, at 1729-30 (describing possible harms that can
occur with application of loose reasonableness standard). Such concerns include
that an inmate's constitutional rights can be ignored when the imagination of the
warden produces a plausible security concern and a deferential trial court is able
to discern a logical connection between that interest and the regulation. See
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 434 n.18 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Because of deference to prison authority, there is the
possibility that inmates would be stripped of all free communication with those
outside the prison. See id.
195. See Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting publish-
ers of magazines and publishing trade organizations made suits similar to prison-
ers' suits).
196. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 125 (stating plaintiff as Marc Ramirez); Amatel,
156 F.3d at 195 (listing plaintiffs as three prisoners, publishers of Playboy and Pent-
house, and publishing trade organization).
197. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 410 n.9 (emphasis added) (demonstrating that
Turner test applies to prisoners as well as publishers). Justice Stevens's dissent in
Thornburgh referred to the rights of non-prisoners "who have a particularized inter-
est in communicating with [prisoners]" as "inextricably meshed" with those of pris-
oners. Id. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
198. See id. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also Miness, supra note 9, at 1731 (relying on Justice Stevens's dissent).
199. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 131 (requiring evidentiary record to prove ra-
tional link between sexually explicit material and harm to government's rehabilita-
tive efforts).
200. See Duffy, supra note 5, at 9 (explaining outcome of Ramirez case).
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Circuit did not find the connection between the Ensign Amend-
ment and the government's rehabilitative interest obvious upon
consideration of the entire federal inmate population. 20 The Ra-
mirez court gave the parties an opportunity to adduce sufficient evi-
dence for a court to determine whether the connection between
the goal of rehabilitation and the restriction of sexually explicit
materials is rational under Turner.20 2
Victoria Ford
201. Compare Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 129 (finding first prong of Turner test could
not be satisfied based on common sense alone), with Amatel, 156 F.3d at 199 (ap-
plying common sense to find rational connection between prison regulation and
government interest).
202. See Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 128, 131 (remanding to district court with this
instruction).
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